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ABSTRACT
Industrial process control systems are time-critical systems
where reliable communications between sensors and actua-
tors need to be guaranteed within strict deadlines to main-
tain safe operation of all the components of the system.
WirelessHART is the most widely adopted standard which
serves as the medium of communication in industrial se-
tups due to its support for Time Division Multiple Access
(TDMA) based communication, multiple channels, chan-
nel hopping, centralized architecture, redundant routes and
avoidance of spatial re-use of channels. However, the com-
munication schedule in WirelessHART network is decided
by a centralized network manager at the time of network
initialization and the same communication schedule repeats
every hyper-period. Due to predictability in the time slots
of the communication schedule, these systems are vulnera-
ble to timing attacks which eventually can disrupt the safety
of the system. In this work, we present a moving target
defense mechanism, the SlotSwapper, which uses schedule
randomization techniques to randomize the time slots over
a hyper-period schedule, while still preserving all the feasi-
bility constraints of a real-time WirelessHART network and
makes the schedule uncertain every hyper-period. We tested
the feasibility of the generated schedules on random topolo-
gies with 100 simulated motes in Cooja simulator. We use
schedule entropy to measure the confidentiality of our al-
gorithm in terms of randomness in the time slots of the
generated schedules.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Time-critical systems such as the industrial process con-
trol systems are real-time cyber-physical systems (CPS) that
monitor and control the production lines in a manufacturing
plant. The number of devices in such setup keeps increas-
ing. To support more devices and to cope up with frequent
changes in the network topology due to addition (removal)
of devices to (from) the network, a switch of the commu-
nication infrastructure from wired networks to wireless net-
works is desirable. Among the existing wireless sensor net-
work (WSN) standards, WirelessHART is best suited for the
industrial process control systems due to its reliable TDMA-
based schedule, centralized architecture, multi-channel sup-
port, channel hopping, redundancy in routes, and avoidance
of spatial re-use of channels.
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RTN’19, July 2019, Stuttgart, Germany
Although the use of wireless brings flexibility and adapt-
ability to the communication infrastructure, it increases the
threats of cyber attacks. Some recent sophisticated attacks
against critical infrastructures such as Stuxnet [1] and Drag-
onfly [2] have alerted us to the shaky protection of the
conventional air gap solution. The main components of a
WirelessHART network are the sensors, actuators, Gate-
way, a network manager, and multiple access points (AP).
Each communication between these devices are real-time
flows with fixed periods and deadlines. To make the flows
schedulable, the schedule in a WirelessHART network is pre-
determined by the centralized network manager at the time
of network initialization. The same schedule is repeated over
every hyper-period (i.e., lowest common multiple of the pe-
riods of all the flows in the network), until there is any
change in the network topology, such as addition/removal
of new/existing devices to/from the network. The repeti-
tive execution of the deterministic flow schedule in a Wire-
lessHART network over every hyper-period makes these sys-
tems vulnerable to timing attacks. Such repetition greatly
helps the attacker to analyze the eavesdropped traces and
infer the schedule. With the inferred schedule, the attacker
can further launch various strategic destructive attack steps.
For instance, the attacker can selectively jam the transmis-
sions from/to a certain critical sensor/actuator which can
eventually breach the safety of the system.
In this work, we aim at reducing the predictability of
the time slots in the communication schedule of a real-time
WirelessHART network. We propose a moving target de-
fense (MTD) mechanism, the SlotSwapper, that random-
izes the time slots in the communication schedule over ev-
ery hyper-period, satisfying all the feasibility constraints of
a real-time WirelessHART network as follows— (1) dead-
lines of all real-time flows in the network are to be satisfied,
(2) the hop sequences associated with each flow are to be
preserved and (3) no conflicting transmissions in the net-
work are allowed. From our analysis, the attacker who can
monitor the wireless transmissions needs at least two hyper-
periods to infer the schedule. Randomizing the schedule over
every hyper-period renders the attacker’s inference futile,
thereby greatly improving the confidentiality of the Wire-
lessHART network’s operations. More varied are the slots
in a schedule, more difficult it is for the attacker to predict
them. Hence, the measure of uncertainty in the time slots
of a schedule can be expressed in terms of the amount of
randomness in the time slots over the hyper-period sched-
ules generated by our algorithm. We re-defined schedule en-
tropy [3] as a metric to measure the uncertainty in predicting
the time slots. We illustrated the feasibility of our proposed
algorithm on random topologies with 100 simulated nodes
in Contiki Cooja [4]. To the best of our knowledge, this
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is the first work on randomization to reduce the determin-
ism of the time slots of a hyper-period schedule in real-time
WirelessHART networks.
2. RELATEDWORK
Two notable works in the literature which adopt ran-
domization techniques in the context of real-time processor
scheduling are taskshuffler [3] and SPARTA [5]. [3] presents a
schedule randomization protocol, the taskshuffler, that shuf-
fles a set of fixed priority real-time tasks on a uniprocessor
system. [5] proposes SPARTA, a scheduler to randomize the
leakage points in the schedule protecting the system from
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks. However, both
of these works are on uniprocessor system. Our problem is
even harder than multi-processor scheduling. m channels
and n real-time flows of our network can be mapped to m
processors and n real-time tasks respectively. However, the
conflicting transmissions among the flows impose additional
constraint in our network which makes our problem even
harder than multi-processor scheduling.
Due to support for TDMA schedule in WirelessHART net-
works, these networks are vulnerable to selective jamming
attacks [6]. [7,8] survey various possible jamming attacks and
the key ideas of existing security mechanisms against such
attacks in WSNs. [9] proposes various types of side-channel
attacks and their respective countermeasures in WSN. The
countermeasures against jamming attacks can be provided
from physical-layer solutions as in [7, 10] or cyber-space so-
lutions such as [11,12]. [13] presents the steps of an attacker
to launch jamming attacks in industrial process control sys-
tems. Recent works such as [14] and [15] provide counter-
measures against timing attacks in single and multi-channel
WSN respectively by permuting the slot utilization pattern
at the node level over a super-frame to randomize the sched-
ule. However, the flows considered in these works are not
associated with deadlines, hence, randomization of slot uti-
lization pattern at the node level makes the flows schedula-
ble. Our problem is more complex. Each flow in our net-
work is a real-time flow with a strict deadline. Permuting
the time-slots at each node does not guarantee deadline sat-
isfaction of all the real-time flows in our network, hence,
existing solutions in [14] and [15] are not applicable.
3. WIRELESSHART BACKGROUND
The WirelessHART protocol, being compliant with IEEE
802.15.4, is the first open wireless communication standard
for measurement and control in network and process indus-
try [16]. A WirelessHART network consists of a Gateway,
multiple field devices, APs and a centralized network man-
ager which are connected via wireless mesh networks. The
network manager, connected to the Gateway, is responsible
for managing the devices, scheduling, creating the routes
and optimizing the network. The field devices are wireless
sensors and actuators which can either transmit or receive
in a particular time slot. Also, in a time slot, a receiver can
receive from exactly one sender. Multiple APs are connected
to the Gateway via wired connections to provide redundant
paths between the Gateway and the network devices. The
key features of the WirelessHART network for which it is
suitable for process industries include
TDMA: For reliable collision-free communications in a Wire-
lessHART network, time is globally synchronized and slotted
into 10ms time slots within which a network device sends a
packet and receives its corresponding acknowledgment.
Channel and route diversity: WirelessHART supports a
maximum of 16 channels [17] at a frequency band of 2.4 GHz.
To avoid interference from neighboring wireless systems, it
adopts channel hopping in every time slot. A channel is
blacklisted if it suffers from external interference. Wire-
lessHART allows route diversity by transmitting a packet
multiple times via multiple paths over different channels.
Avoidance of spatial re-use of channels: To avoid in-
terference and to increase reliability, WirelessHART avoids
spatial re-use of channels [17]. The physical channel as-
signed to a link in a particular time slot is given by [17],
Chp = (ASN + Chl) mod m, where ASN represents Abso-
lute Slot Number and increases at every slot, Chl and Chp
are the logical and physical channels assigned to a node, m
denotes the number of channels in the network.
A WirelessHART network is represented as a graph G =
(V,E), where V is the set of nodes which are the sensors,
actuators and Gateway; E is the set of edges or links between
the devices. An edge e = u→ v, u, v ∈ V , is part of G, if and
only if device u can reliably communicate with device v. In
a transmission along an edge u→ v, the transmitting node,
u, is the sender and the receiving node, v, is the receiver of
the transmission.
Definition 1: Two transmissions along edges u → v and
w → x, where u, v, w, x ∈ V , are said to be conflicting
transmissions, if both of them have the same sender or the
same receiver, i.e., if (u = w)∨ (v = w)∨ (u = x)∨ (v = x).
For each edge u → v ∈ E, there exists a set of conflicting
transmissions in G. To keep track of the conflicting trans-
missions in G, we store an adjacency list known as the Con-
flict List. Each index i in the list corresponds to an edge
in E and the list corresponding to i stores the list of edges
which generate conflicting transmissions with i.
An end-to-end communication between a sensor and an
actuator occurs in two phases: a sensing phase and a con-
trol phase during which the communications are between the
sensors and the Gateway and between the Gateway and the
actuators respectively.
4. SYSTEMMODEL
Our system model consists of a WirelessHART network
G = (V,E) and n end-to-end flows F = {F1,F2, . . .Fn}.
Each flow Fi ∈ F periodically generates a packet at the
source node si ∈ V with period pi. The packet passes via
Gateway and reaches the destination node di ∈ V \ {si}
within deadline δi. We assume that our flows are of implicit
deadline, i.e., δi ≤ pi. A packet is scheduled in more than
one routes between the source and destination for reliability.
Definition 2: The release time (rij) of the j
th instance
of flow Fi (j ≥ 1) is the time at which the jth instance of
Fi is released at the source node si. rij is defined as
rij = (j − 1) · pi. (1)
Definition 3: The number of hops in a route of a flow
Fi is the number of intermediate devices between the source
(si) and the destination (di) in the route of Fi.
Definition 4: Given a graph G with m channels and a set
of flows F , a feasible schedule S is a sequence of trans-
missions over the slots in S along the edges in G. Each
transmission is a mapping of a flow to a channel in a slot
satisfying the following conditions:
1. No transmission conflict: Two transmissions along
u→ v and w → x can be scheduled in the same time slot t,
if u→ v and w → x are non-conflicting transmissions;
2. No collision: If u→ v uses channel y and w → x uses
channel z in the same time slot t, then y 6= z, ∀y, z ∈ [1,m];
3. No deadline violation: If a flow Fj, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, has
h hops, then all the h hops of Fj are to be scheduled within
the deadline δj;
4. Flow sequence preservation: If a flow Fj has h hops,
then the kth hop (1 < k ≤ h) cannot be scheduled until all
the previous k − 1 hops are scheduled.
We assume that the network manager blacklists those
channels from the network in which the probability of suc-
cessful transmission is less than a certain threshold [18].
Therefore, the number of packet drops in the network can be
neglected. At the time of network initialization, the network
manager decides the schedule depending on the number of
available channels, the topology of the network and avail-
able routes for each flow [17], [19]. Given a graph G, a set
of n flows F over G and m channels, the network manager
runs any scheduling algorithm A that generates a schedule
S satisfying all the conditions of Definition 4. The network
manager then informs all the network devices about the al-
located slots in which they can transmit (receive) messages
from specific neighbors. The network devices become ac-
tive only in those slots in which they can transmit (receive)
messages. The same schedule repeats every hyper-period.
5. THREAT MODEL
The main objective of the adversary is to select a critical
sensor or an actuator as the victim node in the network and
predict the time slots in which the victim node sends (re-
ceives) packets to (from) its neighboring nodes by observing
the traffic in the network. Our adversary model is based on
the following assumptions:-
1. The adversary is aware of the network parameters such
as the number of channels adopted by the network.
2. The adversary is equipped with multiple antennae, hence,
he is capable of listening to all 16 channels in 2.4 GHz
ISM band in the network.
Based on the above assumptions, the adversary has the fol-
lowing capabilities:
Capability 1: The adversary can target a specific node
(sensor or actuator) as the victim node in the network and
monitor all communications associated with that node. Af-
ter analyzing the traffic for a sufficiently long period of time,
the adversary can predict the time slots in which the victim
node communicates with its neighbors.
Capability 2: Due to repetitive nature of the communica-
tion schedule, the adversary can estimate the hyper-period
of the schedule. The adversary can use this estimate in the
subsequent hyper-periods to infer the communication time
slots of the victim node.
Capability 3: The adversary can reverse engineer the chan-
nel hopping sequences by silently observing the channel ac-
tivities in the network [20].
With the above three capabilities, the adversary can exe-
cute further destructive attack steps. For instance, the ad-
versary can target specific transmissions from (to) certain
critical sensors (actuators) and can selectively jam the tar-
geted transmissions in specific time slots, thereby causing
Figure 1: A network graph with six nodes and one AP
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
S1 1− 2 — — 2− 3 4− 5 — — 3−AP
ch1 (F1) (F3) (F2) (F3)
4− 5 — 5−AP — 2− 3 3−AP 5−AP —
ch2 (F2) (F2) (F1) (F1) (F2)
S2 — 1− 2 — 5−AP 3−AP 4− 5 — 5−AP
ch1 (F1) (F2) (F1) (F2) (F2)
2− 3 4− 5 2− 3 — — 3−AP —
ch2 (F3) (F2) (F1) (F3)
Table 1: Two schedules S1 and S2 over 8 time slots with
three flows F1, F2, F3 where s1 = 1, s2 = 4, s3 = 2 and
d1 = d2 = d3 = AP .
disruptive effect on the system. Due to repetitive nature of
the hyper-period schedules, same flow gets transmitted in
the same time slot over every hyper-period. Hence, selec-
tively jamming the predicted channel in specific time slots
over every hyper-period results in jamming the targeted flow
with probability 1. Different from the constant jamming
attack that jams all the transmissions, selective jamming
is more stealthy as it allows the attacker to strategically
target certain critical sensors and/or actuators within their
proximity with much lower radio transmission power. This
reduces the overhead and cost for the attacker to implement
the jamming attack [21]. In contrast, random jamming that
does not infer the schedule and jams in randomly selected
slots is much less effective [22].
Attack consequences: Selectively jamming the transmis-
sions from a critical sensor node results in blocking the sen-
sor data to reach the Gateway. As a result, proper con-
trol commands cannot be delivered to the actuators which
in turn may result in degraded performance of the system.
Also, selectively jamming the control commands to reach
the actuators may hamper the safety of the system.
Motivation of our work: The main objective of our work
is to develop a MTD technique, the SlotSwapper, that ran-
domizes the communication time slots over every hyper-
period schedule such that the schedule changes before the
attacker can estimate it. We present a motivating example
to illustrate how the threat can be addressed by randomizing
the time slots in every hyper-period schedule.
Example 1: Consider the network graph shown in Fig-
ure 1 with two channels, three flows, F1, F2 and F3 where
the sources are s1 = 1, s2 = 4, s3 = 2; the destinations
are d1 = d2 = d3 = AP ; the periods and the dealines are
p1 = p3 = δ1 = δ3 = 8, p2 = δ2 = 4 respectively. Consider
S1 in Table 1 to be the hyper-period schedule over the flows.
Consider node 1 to be the victim node. In the traditional
TDMA-based real-time WirelessHART network, the network
starts with schedule S1 which repeats every 8 time slots. An
attacker listening to the channels in the network will find
nodes 1 and 2 communicating every 8 time slots. In par-
ticular, to identify this repetitive pattern, the attacker needs
to listen to the network for at least two hyper-periods, i.e.,
16 time slots. The attacker can launch selective jamming
attack earliest in the 17th slot. With our proposed MTD
technique, a new schedule is followed in each hyper-period,
i.e., if S1 is followed in the first eight slots, then S2 will be
followed in the next eight slots and so on. However, there
is no communication between nodes 1 and 2 in slot 1 in S2,
i.e., the communicating time slots in two consecutive hyper-
periods are different. To identify the repetitive patterns in
the schedule, the attacker needs to monitor the communi-
cations for at least two hyper-periods. Hence, by changing
the schedule every hyper-period, the system will change at
a faster pace compared to the learning pace of the attacker,
rendering further strategic destructive attack steps (e.g., se-
lective jamming) infeasible.
6. PROPOSED MTD TECHNIQUE
Our proposed MTD technique, the SlotSwapper, consists
of two main phases— (1) An offline schedule generation
phase (2) an online schedule selection phase. Sched Gen()
considers an initial hyper-period schedule B for a set of n
flows F over a graph G, and generates a new feasible sched-
ule S ′ by randomizing the slots in B. However, randomiza-
tion of time slots in B is to be done in such a way that all the
conditions of generating a feasible schedule (Definition 4) are
obeyed. To reduce the repeatability of time slots in B, we
propose to run Sched Gen() K times (K is a large number)
in offline mode and generate a set of feasible hyper-period
schedules S. We suggest to select a schedule uniformly at
random every hyper-period from S and execute that sched-
ule over that hyper-period.
Algorithm 1: SlotSwapper
1 S = {B};// a base scehdule
2 for i=1,2 upto K do
3 S = S ∪ Sched Gen();
4 S = Select a random schedule from S every hyper-period ;
Offline Randomized Schedule Generator : Algorithm 2
presents an overview of Sched Gen(). Table 2 summarizes
the notations used in the algorithm. We present an example
to illustrate the steps of Sched Gen().
G a network graph over V nodes and |E| edges
F a set of n flows defined over G
m number of channels in the network
hp hyper-period of n flows
B a base schedule consisting of mapping of a channel in a slot to a
flow over one hp
C Conflict List corresponding to the network graph G
S ′ a copy of the base schedule B
hop list a dictionary to store hop number to slot mapping of all the
flow instances in F
edge list a dictionary to map channel to edge in a particular slot in S ′.
Table 2: List of notations used in the algorithm.
Example 2: Consider the same setting as in Figure 1 and
Example 1. Let S1 in Table 1 be the base schedule. Let us
consider the 1st hop of F3 in S1 with σt = 4 and c ch = 1.
The window corresponding to 1st hop of F3 is [1, 7]. For
every slot σ′t ∈ [1, 7] and every channel ch ∈ [1, 2], we call
trConf() and check for conflicting transmission. 2 → 3
has conflicting transmission with [1→ 2, 2→ 4, 3→ AP ] in
S1. Therefore, (slot,channel) pairs such as, (1, 1), (5, 2) and
(6, 2) are rejected due to transmission conflict with (4, 1).
Similarly, (slot,channel) pairs such as (5, 1) and (7, 2) are
also rejected by function deadPr() due to violation of dead-
lines of the flow instances. (slot,channel) pairs (5, 1) and
Algorithm 2: Sched Gen
1 for tick = 1,2, . . . , hp do
2 for j = 1,2, . . . , |F| do
3 if tick == Fj .deadline then
4 inst = tick/Fj .deadline;
5 for p = 1,2, . . . ,Fj .n hops do
6 σt = slot of p
th hop of inst;
7 elig list = {};// empty list
8 if m == 1 // single-channel
9 then
10 lb = inst ∗ Fj .release time;
11 ub = inst ∗ Fj .deadline;
12 for σ′t = lb, lb+1,. . . , ub do
13 if S′[σ′t] 6= Fj then
14 Add σ′t to the elig list;
15 σrandom = random(elig slots);
16 swap (σt, σrandom);
17 else
18 c ch = channel of pth hop of inst;
19 if p == 1// first hop
20 then
21 lb = inst * Fj .period;
22 else
23 lb = slot of (p− 1)th hop of inst + 1;
24 if p == Fj .n hops // last hop
25 then
26 ub = inst * Fj .deadline;
27 else
28 ub = slot of (p+ 1)th hop of inst - 1;
29 for σ′t = lb, lb+1,. . . , ub do
30 for ch = 1,2,. . . ,m do
31 b1 = trConf(σt, c ch, σ
′
t, ch, C);
32 b2 = deadPr(σt, c ch, σ
′
t, ch);
33 b3 = flowPr(σt, c ch, σ
′
t, ch);
34 if b1 && b2 && b3 == 1 then
35 Add (σ′t, ch) to elig list;
36 (σ, c) = random(elig list);
37 swap(σt, c ch, σ, c);
38 update hop list, edge list and S′;
39 return S′;
(7, 2) correspond to the second instance of F2 with release
time at 5th slot and deadline at 8th slot. Hence, the second
instance of F2 cannot be swapped with any other slot before
slot 5 or after slot 8. Similarly, flowPr() does not allow
(slot,channel) pairs (1, 2), (6, 2) and (7, 2) in the eligible list
in order to preserve the hop sequences of flows. If the trans-
mission corresponding to 1st hop of 1st instance of F2 (via
edge 4 → 5) of (slot,channel) pair (1, 2) is allowed to swap
with (4, 1), then the second hop of that instance of F2 would
have been scheduled before the first hop, violating the hop
sequences of the flow instances. Finally, the list of eligible
(slot,channel) pairs are — [(2, 1), (2, 2), (3, 1), (3, 2), (4, 2),
(6, 1), (7, 1)]. Let (3, 2) be the randomly selected element.
Swapping the transmissions and the flow instances between
(3, 2) and (4, 1) and iterating the same procedure over all the
flow instances generates a completely new feasible schedule.
Online Selection of Schedules: On executing Sched Gen()
K times in offline mode, we get a set of feasible schedules S.
At the time of network initialization, each node is informed
about the time-slots in which it can send/receive messages in
each of these K hyper-period schedules. The online schedule
selector runs at each node once in every hyper-period, se-
lects a schedule S from S uniformly at random and executes
S over that hyper-period. To ensure that the same schedule
is selected at each node, we propose to use a pseudo-random
number generator (PRNG) [23] (assumed to be secure) ini-
tialized with the same seed at each node. This allows each
node to select the same schedule every hyper-period without
any additional communication.
7. MEASURE OF UNCERTAINTY
Given a set of schedules S generated by Sched Gen(), we
need to quantify the amount of uncertainty in the schedules
in S. In [3], schedule entropy is used to measure the uncer-
tainty of a given schedule for a uniprocessor system. We
have redefined schedule entropy as a function of the slot and
channel entropy to measure the randomness in the schedules
in S. In a multi-channel WirelessHART network, each of the
slots σi in a schedule S consists of m channels which can be
represented as σi = {ci1, ci2, . . . , cim}. Given a hyper-period
schedule S over l slots and m channels for a set of flows F ,
the occurrence of the jth flow Fj in the kth channel of ith slot
is a discrete random variable with possible outcomes from
0 to n, where 0 represents idle flow, n is the total number
of flows in F . Let cik = j denotes the jth flow occurring in
the kth channel of ith slot of S. However, the occurrence of
the jth flow in the kth channel of the ith slot restricts the
occurrence of some other flow F ′j in the same channel of the
same slot. Also, if a flow Fj completes its hops in the ith
slot in the schedule, it cannot occur in the subsequent slots
until the arrival of its next instance. We therefore, define
Schedule entropy as
Definition 5: Schedule entropy over a set of flows F for
a WirelessHART network with m channels is the conditional
entropy of Fj occurring in the kth channel of the ith slot,
given the entropy of all the slots from 1 to i− 1. It is repre-
sented as
H(S) =
l∑
i=1
H(σi|σ1, σ2, . . . , σi−1) (2)
H(σi) = −
n∑
ci1=0
n∑
ci2=0
. . .
n∑
cim=0
Pr(ci1, ci2, . . . , cim)
log2 Pr(ci1, ci2, . . . , cim) (3)
For a multi-channel WirelessHART network with n flows
(n > 16), the number of possible permutations in the cal-
culation of the joint probability for each slot is exponential.
Hence, we consider the empirical probability distribution of
the flows across all the channels in each slot which is an
upper-approximated value of slot entropy as the joint prob-
ability is always less than or equal to the sum of individ-
ual probabilities [24]. Further, calculation of conditional en-
tropy in Equation (2) involves joint probability distribution
of slots in S, which is exponential in nature. So, we consider
the empirical probability distribution of the slots in S.
Definition 6: Upper-approximated slot entropy H˜(σi)
and Upper-approximated schedule entropy H˜(S) are de-
fined respectively as follows
H˜(σi) = −
m∑
k=1
n∑
j=0
Pr(cik = j) log2 Pr(cik = j) (4)
H˜(S) =
l∑
i=1
H˜(σi). (5)
where Pr(cik = j) is the probability mass function of the j
th
flow occurring in the kth channel of the ith slot.
8. EVALUATION
Simulation setup: We use Cooja simulator [4] of Con-
tiki 3.0 to test the feasibility of our schedules. We gen-
erated three random topologies with 100 simulated Tmote
Sky motes by varying the degree of nodes (θ) or the number
of incoming and outgoing edges incident on a node — (1)
Graph A (θ between 2 to 4) (2) Graph B (θ between 3 to 6)
(3) Graph C (θ between 3 to 8). More the degree of a node,
more are the chances of conflicting transmissions and less
is the number of available flows for a particular time-slot.
Nodes with highest number of neighbors are considered to
be the APs.
Flow Generation: A fraction (α) percent of the nodes
are randomly selected as the source and destination nodes.
The source and destination nodes are disjoint. In our ex-
periments we varied α between 20-80%. We selected the
number of hops of each flow to be between 2 to 8 [25] and
considered the shortest path as the primary path. The flows
have implicit-deadline with periods varying randomly in the
range of 27 to 210.
Experiments: We fixed the hyper-period at 210 time slots
and ran experiments upto 10000 hyper-periods with the num-
ber of flows and the number of channels varying between
10 to 40 and 1 to 4 respectively. For each condition, we
generated 100 random instances and measured the upper
approximated schedule entropy (H˜(S)) for each of these in-
stances. Figure 2 shows H˜(S) for all the tested scenarios. It
has been observed that H˜(S) is maximum for single-channel
WirelessHART network for all three graphs. This is because
in single-channel WirelessHART networks, there is no con-
flicting transmissions among the flows in the network. As a
result, a flow can be scheduled at any slot within its release
time and deadline. For a fixed number of channels, H˜(S)
increases significantly with increase in the number of flows
upto 30. After that, there is no significant increase in the
value of H˜(S) with increase in the number of flows. This is
because, with increase in the number of flows more flows can
appear in a slot. However, as the number of flows increase,
the number of conflicting transmissions among the flows in-
crease which in turn restricts the number of available flows
to be scheduled in a particular slot. H˜(S) also increases with
increase in the number of channels between 2 to 4, as the
number of available positions for a flow to be scheduled get
increased. However, it has been observed that with increase
in the number of channels, the increase in H˜(S) is signif-
icantly less for Graph C. Among all the three graphs, the
number of edges is maximum in Graph C resulting in more
conflicting transmissions among the flows thereby restricting
the number of available positions to schedule a flow.
Although we ran our algorithm upto 10000 hyper-periods
to measure the randomness in the generated schedules, the
amount of memory available to each Tmote sky mote is not
sufficiently large to store large number of schedules. We
measured that each mote can only support a maximum of
2000 time slot information. We observed that, if a node is in
the path of all the 40 flows, then it requires to store at-least
80 time slot information per schedule (40 for transmissions
and 40 for re-transmissions). With this specification, we
were able to store 25 schedules in each node. We can man-
Figure 2: Upper Approximated Schedule Entropy over Graph A,Graph B and Graph C, with number of flows varying between
10 to 40 and number of channels between 1 to 4 with a hyper-period of 1024 time slots
ually tune the nodes with different sets of schedules after
several hyper-periods to further reduce the chance of pre-
dicting the schedules. Our MTD technique only involves
an additional random number generation in each node once
in every hyper-period, the power consumption of which is
negligibly small.
9. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented an MTD mechanism, the SlotSwap-
per, to reduce the predictability of TDMA slots in a real-
time WirelessHART network. We used schedule entropy to
measure the uncertainty of the schedules generated by our
algorithm. We illustrated the feasibility of the schedules on
simulated networks in Cooja with 100 Tmote sky motes.
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